福利供给视角下地方政府的低保纳保逻辑——基于A省低保“标提围扩量减”治理困境的分析  

The Logic of Enrollment in Minimum Livelihood Guarantees by Local Governments from the Perspective of Welfare Provision——An Analysis of the Governance Dilemma of "Increasing Standards and Expanding Coverage but Beneficiaries Decreasing" in Province A

作　　者：王强[1] Wang Qiang(College of International Tourism and Public Administration,Hainan University,Haikou,570228,China)

机构地区：[1]海南大学国际旅游和公共管理学院,海口570228

出　　处：《公共管理学报》2025年第2期88-100,172,共14页Journal of Public Management

基　　金：国家社会科学基金青年项目(22CSH071);教育部人文社会科学研究西部项目(24XJCZH008),教育部哲学社会科学研究重大课题攻关项目(23JZD031)。

摘　　要：近年来,中央推动低保“提标扩围”,大幅提高低保标准,降低准入门槛,加大财政投入。但全国低保受助人数和覆盖率却不升反降,呈现“标提围扩量减”悖论。本研究聚焦这一治理困境,基于A省低保政策执行的分析,构建了地方政府低保纳保的分析框架,综合探讨了影响地方政府纳保的驱动因素和阻滞因素,揭示了低保扩围增效的治理困境以及地方政府低保纳保的逻辑。研究发现:地方政府在执行低保纳保政策时,既受到上级政府的激励和压力驱动,也面临自身诸多阻滞因素影响。政策特性和政策情境的负向调节,减弱了地方政府纳保压力和纳保激励,强化了地方政府纳保阻滞力,使地方政府出现了“不想多纳保、不敢多纳保和不能多纳保”的纳保逻辑。在此基础上,本研究还进一步凝练出地方政府福利供给的理论解释框架,其理论意义在于为分析地方政府政策执行和地方福利供给行为提供了理论解释工具;其现实意义在于为全国范围内低保“扩围增效”提供理论支撑,并对抑制地方政府福利冲动和弥补福利建设欠账提供理论指导。In recent years, the central government has promoted the policy of "increasing standards and expanding coverage" for minimum livelihood guarantees, significantly raising benefit levels, lowering eligibility thresholds, and increasing fiscal investment. Nevertheless, the number of beneficiaries and coverage rates have paradoxically declined nationwide, illustrating a dilemma of "increasing standards, expanding coverage, but beneficiaries decreasing". This study addresses this governance challenge by analyzing the implementation of minimum livelihood guarantee policies in Province A. It constructs an analytical framework for local government enrollment in these guarantees, investigating both the driving and hindering factors that affect local government subsistence allowance, reveals the governance dilemma of "expanding coverage and increasing efficiency" and the logic of local government subsistence allowance. The findings indicate that local governments are influenced by incentives and pressures from higher-level authorities while also confronting numerous internal obstacles. The negative moderating effects of policy characteristics and contextual factors diminish both the pressure and incentives for local governments enrollment in minimum livelihood guarantees, thereby strengthening their resistance to enrollment. Hence this results in a logic characterized of "reluctance to enroll more, fear of enrolling more, and inability to enroll more". Building upon this analysis, the paper further develops a theoretical framework for understanding local government welfare provision, which serves as a theoretical explanatory tool for analyzing policy execution and welfare supply behaviors. The practical significance of this study lies in providing theoretical support for the nationwide expansion and enhancement of minimum livelihood guarantees, as well as guiding theoretically efforts to mitigate local government welfare impulses and address existing welfare deficiencies.

关 键 词：地方政府 社会福利供给 低保扩围增效 政策执行 央地委托代理关系 

分 类 号：D630[政治法律—政治学]