横向合并对双边市场串通行为促进作用的研究  

A Research on the Contribution of Horizontal Mergers to Collusive Behavior in Two-sided Markets

作　　者：胡祎祎 Hu Yiyi

机构地区：[1]南京审计大学经济学院,江苏南京211815

出　　处：《河南大学学报(社会科学版)》2025年第2期31-37,153,共8页Journal of Henan University(Social Sciences)

摘　　要：通常认为市场中的合并行为会导致企业之间发生串通的可能性增大。假设双边市场中平台拥有对称的双边用户且平台之间具有产品横向差异化特征,以此来研究平台之间的横向合并是否会促进双边市场中串通行为的产生。从理论上分析了合并对于临界贴现因子的影响:临界贴现因子是指在无限重复博弈中支持串通作为均衡结果的最小折现因子。从结果分析可知,如果双边市场中部分平台参与合并,当交叉网络外部性足够大时,参与合并的平台维持合并后串通的意愿低于维持合并前的串通;而外部平台(即不参与合并的平台)维持合并后的串通的意愿更高。因此,横向合并未必会推动双边市场串通行为的产生。A prevailing concern regarding mergers is that they may make successful collusion more likely.This paper tests whether this logic can be applied to two-sided markets by investigating whether horizontal mergers between horizontally differentiated platforms facilitate collusion in a two-sided market with two symmetric sides of consumers.The paper provides a theoretical analysis of the impacts of these mergers on the critical discount factors,which are the minimum discount factors supporting collusion in an infinitely repeated game as an equilibrium outcome.Generally,given a merger between two of three platforms,the merged platforms are less willing to sustain collusion after the merger than before the merger when cross-group externalities are significant enough.However,the outside platform is more cooperative in sustaining post-merger collusion than in sustaining premerger collusion.

关 键 词：串通 横向合并 双边市场 交叉网络外部性 

分 类 号：F016[经济管理—政治经济学]