RJV卡特尔联盟结构的均衡分析及稳定性  

Equilibrium Analysis and Stability of RJV Cartel Alliance Structures

作　　者：李昌文 周永务[3] 梁培培 李绩才[5] LI Changwen;ZHOU Yongwu;LIANG Peipei;LI Jicai(School of Economics and Management,Huaibei Normal University,Huaibei 235000,China;School of Business Administration,Chaohu University,Hefei 238000,China;School of Business Administration,South China University of Technology,Guangzhou 510641,China;School of Economics and Management,Anqing Normal University,Anqing 246133,China;Research Center of Industrial Economy,Zhejiang Normal University,Jinhua 321004,China)

机构地区：[1]淮北师范大学经济与管理学院,安徽淮北235000 [2]巢湖学院工商管理学院,安徽合肥238000 [3]华南理工大学工商管理学院,广东广州510641 [4]安庆师范大学经济与管理学院,安徽安庆246133 [5]浙江师范大学产业经济研究中心,浙江金华321004

出　　处：《工程管理科技前沿》2025年第2期90-96,共7页Frontiers of Science and Technology of Engineering Management

基　　金：安徽省社会科学创新发展研究课题(2023CX069);巢湖学院高层次人才项目(KYQD-2023008);国家社会科学基金资助项目(22BGL120)。

摘　　要：RJV卡特尔联盟内的企业通过合作内化技术溢出和协调研发投入,从而达到共享技术以及降低成本的目的。针对研发和生产合作,本文利用两阶段方法给出了任意联盟结构内企业的均衡结果,包括研发产出、生产产量以及利润,然后基于Nash稳定和最大一致集分别探讨联盟结构的短视稳定和远视稳定。结果表明技术溢出率和研发技术难度对联盟结构的稳定性有重要影响:(1)短视角度下大联盟都不稳定,只有当溢出率和研发难度都较小时大联盟有可能远视稳定;(2)无论从短视还是远视角度,当研发难度较大时,任何合作联盟都不稳定。Technological cooperation among firms not only facilitates the complementary advantages of resources and enhances synergistic effects,but also reduces redundant capital investment and mitigates innovation risks.For instance,the Semiconductor Manufacturing Technology Consortium(SEMATECH)has achieved a 9%reduction in R&D expenditures for the U.S.semiconductor industry through collaborative efforts.Within the RJV cartel framework,member firms share R&D technologies and coordinate their investments to maximize the overall profitability.However,the technology spillover effects and R&D difficulty can significantly impact inter-firm collaboration,potentially leading to the failure of strategic alliances.Therefore,it is of considerable research value to thoroughly investigate the influence of the technology spillover effects and R&D difficulty on the stability of R&D alliances.In this study,we posit the existence of n firms in the market that form multiple strategic alliances.We employ a twostage game-theoretic model to investigate equilibrium configurations across both the R&D and production phases.During the initial investment stage,coalition members jointly optimize R&D expenditure allocations via technology-sharing mechanisms.Subsequently,coordinated production quantity decisions are implemented within each consortium.Through this sequential analytical framework,we derive coalition-specific equilibrium solutions and apply Nash stability and the largest consistent set to evaluate the myopic and farsighted stability of RJV cartel coalition structures for n=3 and n=4.It has been identified that the spillover rate and R&D difficulty significantly influence the stability of RJV cartel alliances.Specifically:(1)In a market with three firms,the grand coalition structure exhibits myopic instability regardless of the spillover rate or R&D difficulty.Only when both the spillover rate and R&D difficulty are relatively low can the grand coalition structure potentially achieve farsighted stability.Both myopically and farsightedly

关 键 词：RJV卡特尔 联盟 短视稳定结构 远视稳定结构 

分 类 号：F224.32[经济管理—国民经济]