特别表决权股东控制权滥用的司法审查标准  

Judicial Review Standards for Abuse of Control by Super-voting Shareholders

作　　者：夏小雄[1] Xia Xiaoxiong

机构地区：[1]中国社会科学院法学研究所

出　　处：《比较法研究》2025年第2期63-81,共19页Journal of Comparative Law

摘　　要：双重股权结构作为控制权的增强机制,强化了特别表决权股东的控制权。探究特别表决权股东控制权的边界范围并确立规范控制权滥用的司法审查标准具有重要意义。域外经验表明,对于特别表决权股东控制权滥用行为的司法审查原则上应当采纳“完全公平规则”,相关行为的公平性必须在两个方面加以证明:一是程序的公平性;二是实质的公平性。但是,“完全公平规则”有其弊端,尤其是价格维度/实质层面的公平性评价带有一定的主观性,应当加以改造或修正,通过更为严格的程序性措施保障公平性。在我国双重股权结构实践过程中,有必要引入“完全公平规则”并根据司法实践进展逐步加以完善,防范特别表决权股东滥用控制权,保障双重股权结构制度有效实施。The dual-class share structure,as a control-enhancing mechanism,amplifies authority of super-voting shareholders.Establishing the clear boundaries for the exercise of such control and formulating judicial review standards to adjudicate its abuse hold critical significance for corporate governance.Comparative legal analysis reveals that the judicial review of control abuse by super-voting shareholders should primarily adopt the"entire fairness standard,"requiring proof of fairness across two dimensions:procedural rigor(fair process),and substantive equity(fair price).However,the"entire fairness standard"faces inherent drawbacks,particularly the subjective nature of pricing assessments within substantive fairness evaluation.To mitigate this,reforms emphasizing stringent procedural measures are necessary.In China's dual-class share structure regime,adopting a refined"entire fairness standard"gradually optimized through judicial practice emerges as a vital mechanism to deter control abuse while preserving the institutional integrity of dual-class governance frameworks.

关 键 词：双重股权结构 特别表决权 商业判断规则 完全公平规则 

分 类 号：D922.291.91[政治法律—经济法学]