绿色住宅市场监管的演化博弈分析——基于中央环保督察体系视角  

Evolutionary Game Analysis of Green Housing Market Regulation under the Central Environmental Protection Inspection

作　　者：叶学平[1] 赵博云 YE Xueping;ZHAO Boyun

机构地区：[1]湖北省社会科学院经济研究所,湖北武汉430077

出　　处：《深圳社会科学》2025年第3期97-110,共14页Social Sciences in Shenzhen

摘　　要：中央环保督察作为我国加强地方政府落实环境保护主体责任的重要措施,对规范绿色住宅市场主体行为有重要作用。针对绿色住宅市场存在的监管缺失问题,通过构建中央政府、地方政府和房地产商为主体的绿色住宅市场的监管三方演化博弈模型,基于湖北省实际数据仿真模拟,对中央环保督察体系下绿色住宅市场的监管决策进行分析。研究发现,第一,共存在4个演化博弈稳定点,其中中央政府始终选择监管作为博弈策略选择。中央政府、地方政府以及房地产商初始博弈策略均衡点为(监管,严格监管,投机开发绿色住宅),主要原因在于绿色住宅开发成本过高和政策实施初期制度的不完善。但是,对地方政府激励相关参数、企业绿色住宅开发收益以及中央政府对于地方政府的惩罚力度进行参数调整后,三者博弈策略会移至最佳演化稳定点(监管,严格监管,合规开发绿色住宅)。第二,房地产商选择合规开发绿色住宅主要取决于绿色住宅开发成本而非两级政府监管。第三,市场参与机制下环保税收优惠、投机时房地产商被回收资金比例、房地产商获补助资金占专项补助比例以及中央对地方政府的惩罚是影响博弈演化均衡的主要因素。第四,地方政府提高环保专项资金用于房地产行业的比例对于促进房地产商合规开发绿色住宅的效果有限,地方政府可以适当提高环保专项资金用于绿色住宅的建设。As an important measure to strengthen the local government’s implementation of the main responsibility of environmental protection,the central environmental protection inspection plays an important role in regulating the behavior of the main body of the green residential market.To solve the problem of lack of regulation in the green residential market,this paper analyzes the evolutionary stability of the strategic choices of each participant by constructing a tripartite evolutionary game model with the central government,local governments and real estate developers as the main body,and analyzes the regulatory decision-making of the green residential market under the system of central environmental protection inspection based on the simulation of the actual data in Hubei Province.The results show that the environmental protection tax preference under the market participation mechanism,the proportion of real estate developers’recovered funds in case of speculation,the proportion of real estate developers’subsidy funds to the special subsidy,and the central government’s punishment to local governments are the main factors affecting the equilibrium;real estate developers’choice of compliant development of green houses mainly depends on the cost of green house development rather than the two-tiered governmental regulation;to realize the compliant development of green houses,the central government’s and local government’s guiding To achieve green residential development compliance,the central and local governments’guidance measures need to reach the threshold,among which increasing environmental tax incentives is the most effective,and increasing the proportion of subsidies for real estate developers has limited effect.Finally,based on the conclusions,we propose countermeasures and recommendations for realizing high-quality development of the green housing market and improving the level of government regulation.

关 键 词：中央环保督察 绿色住宅 环保监管 演化博弈 

分 类 号：F299.23[经济管理—国民经济]