条件化、干预和影像——信念度改变的三径路  

Conditionalization,Intervention and Imaging-Three Ways of Changing the Degree of Belief

作　　者：吴小安 Xiao’an Wu(School of Marxism,Northwestern Polytechnical University)

机构地区：[1]西北工业大学马克思主义学院

出　　处：《逻辑学研究》2025年第2期1-23,共23页Studies in Logic

基　　金：国家社科基金重大项目“西方语言哲学前沿问题研究”(23&ZD240)。

摘　　要：本文讨论了信念度改变的三种方式。前两种是在获得新的观测信息或者干预信息的情况下,一个完美的理性主体如何改变信念度的方法;后一种是关于在可能世界的框架内如何对反事实指派概率的影像理论,同样也是一种关于概率如何流变的理论。我将说明和比较在可能世界的框架如何来理解这三种信念度的改变。珀尔将以干预理论的运作机制为参考,修正刘易斯的影像理论,这个修正的影像理论相较于干预理论有其优势,比如对于析取前件反事实的处理,但我将证明因为这个修正要把刘易斯原先所采用的罗伯特·斯塔内克语义替换为他自己的语义,不再能得到原初的结果,即P^(A)(C)=IP(A□→C)。This paper discusses three ways in which degree of beliefs can change.The first two are ways of how a perfectly rational agent can change the degree of belief given new observational or intervening information;the latter is an imaging theory of how probabil ities are assigned to counterfactuals within the framework of possible worlds,and like wise a theory of how probabilities flow.I will illustrate and compare how the above three changes in degrees of belief can be understood within the framework of possible worlds.And Judea Pearl modify Lewis’s imaging theory with reference to the workings of the intervention theory,and this revised imaging theory has advantages over the interven tion theory,such as the treatment of analytic antecedent counterfactuals,but because this revision replaces the Robert Stalnaker semantics that Lewis originally adopted with his own,I will show that it will no longer yield the original result that P^(A)(C)=IP(A□→C).

关 键 词：条件概率 影像 结构因果模型 加权系统 

分 类 号：B81[哲学宗教—逻辑学]