风险企业控制权分配的博弈过程分析  

Allocation of Control Rights between Venture Capitalist and Entrepreneur by Game Theory

作　　者：安实[1] 王健[1] 何琳[1] 

机构地区：[1]哈尔滨工业大学管理学院,黑龙江哈尔滨150001

出　　处：《系统工程理论与实践》2002年第12期81-87,共7页Systems Engineering-Theory & Practice

摘　　要：　风险投资的高风险性和信息不对称性,使风险投资中控制权分配问题逐渐成为关系到风险投资项目成败的关键.本文运用博弈论的有关方法,分析控制权在风险资本家和风险企业家之间分配的博弈过程,研究了控制权分配的博弈目标、风险投资决策前的博弈、控制权分配谈判中的博弈和控制权执行中的博弈,可作为风险资本家参与风险企业控制权分配和进行投资决策的参考.High risks and asymmetric information in venture investment lead the allocation of control rights between venture capitalist and entrepreneur to become a key problem in the successful operation of venture project. This paper analyzes the allocation of control rights between venture capitalist and entrepreneur by game theory, including their objective in the game during the allocation of control rights, the game between them before venture finance, during the negotiation on the allocation of control rights and on the enforcement of the control rights, which are instructive for venture capitalist participating in the allocation of control rights and making investment decision.

关 键 词：风险企业 控制权 分配 博弈权 

分 类 号：F830.59[经济管理—金融学]