转轨国家的机制性腐败:一个一般均衡模型  

Mechanism-Related Corruption in Transition Countries : A General Equilibrium Model

作　　者：李克[1] 

机构地区：[1]南京大学长江三角洲社会与经济发展研究中心

出　　处：《经济社会体制比较》2003年第1期30-40,共11页Comparative Economic & Social Systems

摘　　要：本文通过一个一般均衡模型考察腐败对经济福利、分工的网络规模以及社会生产力的影响。我们首先计算了在每个个体均可自由择业的市场经济中的瓦尔拉斯均衡;然后考察当一个特权集团被选定为高层管理者时对社会福利产生的影响;最后考虑在管理者通过其代理人而形成共谋时的情形,即机制性腐败。此时,这个代理人通过索取一笔相当于贿赂的进入费用来为管理者的利益服务,而这时的管理者服务的价格仍然由一个瓦尔拉斯市场的供给和需求决定。该模型表明腐败增加了转轨国家特权集团(包括腐败的官员以及与其密切联关的人)的福利,并以牺牲大众的利益为代价。This paper investigates that the influence of corruption on economic welfare, the network scale of division of labor, and social productivity through a general equilibrium model. We firstly calculate that the Walras equilibrium from a market economy, where each individual can choose his or her occupation freely, then investigate the influence of a privileged group on the society when the group is elected as high level governor, and lastly consider the situation of joint conspiracy from governors through their agents, namely mechanism-related corruption. Here, the agents serve the benefits of governor through charging an entrance fee, which is correspondent to the bribery , while the price of governor service at this moment is still decided by the supply and demand of a Walras market. This model indicates clearly that corruption increases the wellbeing of privileged groups(including corruptive officials and other closely related people)in the transition countries , and that this increase is based on the loss of interests of the masses.

关 键 词：转轨国家 机制性腐败 一般均衡模型 分工 专业化 

分 类 号：D630.9[政治法律—政治学]