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机构地区:[1]山东大学管理学院,山东济南250100 [2]山东财经大学会计学院,山东济南250014
出 处:《金融经济学研究》2015年第3期95-106,共12页Financial Economics Research
基 金:山东省社会科学规划研究项目(11CGLZ06)
摘 要:以中国制造业上市公司2009~2013年数据为基础,分析融资约束下终极控制股东对企业价值影响的实证结果表明,相对终极控制股东为非国有而言,终极控制股东为国有时企业价值受融资约束程度的影响较小,但统计上不显著;终极控制股东的控制权、现金流权与企业价值的显著负相关关系随融资约束程度的增加而显著减弱;两权分离度和企业价值的正相关关系随融资约束程度的增加而显著减弱。研究表明融资约束在终极控制股东影响企业价值中有重要作用。最后,根据研究结论提出优化股权结构等对策建议。This paper investigates ultimate controlling shareholders ' impact on enterprise value with financing constraints in a sample of listed manufacturing enterprises in China during the period 2009-2013. The results show that the effect of financing constraints on enterprise value is smaller when the ultimate controlling shareholders are state than that of non-state,and the degree of the impact is not statistically significant. The significantly negative correlation between the control right as well as the cash flow right of ultimate controlling shareholder and enterprise value is significantly weakened when the degree of financing constraints increases. The positive correlation between the degree of the ownership separation and enterprise value is significantly weakened when the degree of financing constraints increases. These show that financing constraints play an important role in ultimate controlling shareholders' impact on enterprise value. Finally,such suggestions as optimizing ownership structure are given according to the conclusion.
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