我国是否应该引入资本充足性管制制度  

作　　者：李宗怡[1] 冀勇鹏[2] 

机构地区：[1]南开大学金融系 [2]南开大学国际商学院

出　　处：《财经科学》2003年第2期51-57,共7页Finance & Economics

摘　　要：根据实证研究 ,资本充足性管制可能具有促使资本 /资产比率较低的银行提高资本充足性的作用 ,但是其是否能降低银行的风险取向至今还没有明确的结论。同时资本充足性管制会导致银行贷款供给的下降 ,从而对宏观经济产生紧缩性效果。本文通过成本—收益分析来回答我国是否应该实行严格的资本充足性管制制度这一问题 ,结论是目前资本充足性管制其符号意义远大于实质意义 。Experimental studies prove that capital adequacy requirements may lead banks to hold higher capital ratios than they otherwise would. But it is not clear whether capital requirements can decrease the risk-taking incentives of banks. And constraints on capital requirements put a contractionary effect on macroeconomy through reduction in bank lending. This paper answers the question whether capital adequacy requirements regulation should be introduced into Chinese banks by cost and income analysis. And the conclusion is that currently capital adequacy requirements regulation means a symbol more than an effective tool for China. And it should be introduced after relatively perfect corporate governance has been established in government-owned banks.

关 键 词：资本充足性 商业银行 监管 公司治理 

分 类 号：F830.2[经济管理—金融学]