信息不对称、股权制度安排与上市企业过度投资  

Information Asymmetry, Equity Structure Design and the Overinvestment of Listed Enterprises

作　　者：潘敏[1] 金岩[1] 

机构地区：[1]武汉大学商学院,武汉430072

出　　处：《金融研究》2003年第1期36-45,共10页Journal of Financial Research

摘　　要：本文运用一个包含有信息不对称和我国现有股权制度安排下的股东目标差异等因素在内的企业股权融资投资决策模型 ,分析了我国上市企业股权融资偏好下过度投资的形成机制。分析的结果表明 ,即使不考虑信息不对称因素 ,我国上市企业同股不同权、流通股比例偏低的股权制度安排也会导致股权融资下的过度投资行为发生 ;在同时考虑信息不对称和我国上市企业特殊股权制度安排的情况下 ,与仅考虑信息不对称因素的成熟证券市场上同股同权企业股权融资下的投资行为相比 。This paper analyzes the overinvestment of China's listed enterprises which have the preferences of equity financing, basing on information asymmetries and divergences of stockholders' objectives on the equity structure design. We show that the special equity structure design of China's listed enterprises will cause the overinvestment of equity financing even though information asymmetries are not considered, and if information asymmetries and the special equity structure design are considered, the possibility of overinvestment of China's listed enterprises will be large than it of enterprises which stockholders have the same rights with information asymmetries.

关 键 词：信息不对称 股权制度安排 中国 证券市场 代理成本 过度投资行为 上市公司 

分 类 号：F830.91[经济管理—金融学]