中国上市公司收购监管模式评析  

The Analysis of Current Supervision Pattern on the Takeover of Listed Company

作　　者：郑琰[1] 

机构地区：[1]北京大学金融法研究中心,北京100871

出　　处：《金融研究》2003年第2期38-48,共11页Journal of Financial Research

摘　　要：本文探讨中国上市公司证券监管模式的演变及其成效问题。作者认为仅凭中国证监会之力无法减少上市公司收购中的混乱无序 ;中国证监会减少实质性审批 ,市场未必更乱 ;中国当前的上市公司收购监管模式未必能达到立法者期望的目标。本文通过对监管模式本身的评价 。The article explores the development and effectiveness of current supervision pattern on the takeover of listed companies. Does the authorities of CSRC reduce the disorders in takeovers of listed companies? Does the abolishment of the substantial examining will bring more chaos? Will the current pattern of supervision achieve the objectives set by the lawmakers? Based on the analysis on supervision pattern, this paper advocates the information disclosure pattern on the supervision of takeovers of listed companies

关 键 词：中国 上市公司 企业收购 证券监管模式 信息披露 证券法 信用制度 

分 类 号：F830.91[经济管理—金融学]