信息系统项目监理机制的经济学分析  

The Analysis of Intendance Mechanism in Information System Project with Economics View

作　　者：方德英[1,2] 李敏强[1] 

机构地区：[1]天津大学管理学院 [2]洛阳工学院工商学院,河南洛阳471003

出　　处：《管理工程学报》2003年第2期98-102,共5页Journal of Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management

摘　　要：首先基于目前社会环境及信息系统 (IS)的特点、借助委托 代理理论 ,说明了IS项目二元组织机制存在突出的“逆向选择风险”和“道德风险” ;其次 ,分监理方为“非参与人”和“参与人”两种情况 ,并考虑到开发商及监理方对待风险的态度 ,分析了引入监理后的三元组织结构在抑制逆向选择风险和道德风险方面的作用 ,提出了监理制的适用条件和对监理方的技术及道德要求 ;最后指出有效发挥监理制在IS项目中的作用 ,还需要行业、国家的共同努力。Firstly,based on current social environment and the characters of information system project,it is explained that there are signifi cant adverse selection and moral hazard shortages in owner and developer dualist ic structure by principalagent theory.Secondly,cosidering the risk preferences o f developer and intendancy in trinal structure after introducing intendancy,the functions of intendancy are analyzed in two cases,e.g.taking intendancy as non player or as player,and in two aspects,e.g.adverse selection and moral hazard.Th en we presented the adaptable intendance mechanism requirements to intendancys technology and ethics.Finally it is pointed that there are many things to be don e by both IS industry and the state for getting efficient intendance.

关 键 词：IS项目 监理机制 委托-代理 项目监理 经济学分析 社会环境及信息系统 IT业 

分 类 号：F407.67[经济管理—产业经济]