电信企业的兼并、分拆和接入的规制  

Vertical Structures and Access Regulation in Telecommunicat ions

作　　者：周惠中 

机构地区：[1]西密执安大学

出　　处：《经济学（季刊）》2002年第1期131-148,共18页China Economic Quarterly

摘　　要：电信企业在不同的纵向结构和接入规制制度下表现出不同的行为和效率。在强制接入但接入费率不受规制的情况下，市话长话兼营结构下的长话资费比分离结构下的资费高。但在接入全面规制或完全市场化的情况下，兼营结构的效率较分离结构为高。在三种规制制度下，生产者的利润在分离结构下都比较高，而消费者却在兼营结构下得利较多。这些结论表明接入的规制应该跟产业政策和竞争政策结合起来考虑。本文还发现如果互联费率高于边际成本，那么网络经营者越多，市话资费可能会越高。Competition in telecommunications is affected by the vertical structure of the industry as well as regulation on access.We find that,under partial deregulation, where access is mandated but access rates are not regulated,the access charge and hence the price of long distance calls is lower when access providers are not integrated with long-distance operators than when they are integrated.However,under both complete deregulation and full regulation,competition in integration is more efficient than sepa- ration.Under all three regulation regimes,consumers are better off in integration than separation,while the firms are worse off.These results suggest that regulation on ac- cess should be formulated in conjunction with industrial or competition policy.We also find that two-part tariffs intensify competition among networks and that more access providers may actually reduce efficiency if the interconnection rate is set should be above the marginal cost.

关 键 词：电信企业 企业兼并 接入规制 中国 电话资费 

分 类 号：F626[经济管理—产业经济] F632.3