非对称信息下创业投资IPO退出激励机制研究  

Research on Motivation Model of IPO Exit to Venture Entrepreneur under Asymmetric Information

作　　者：王亚民[1] 朱荣林[1] 

机构地区：[1]上海交通大学管理学院,上海200030

出　　处：《管理科学》2003年第1期37-40,共4页Journal of Management Science

基　　金：国家社会科学基金"青年项目"(02CJY016)

摘　　要：创业投资促进创新,加速高科技产业和国民经济发展。通过对证券市场IPO机制的创业企业家激励功能理论分析和模型研究发现,证券市场IPO机制使创业资本可以通过IPO退出,形成对创业企业家以公司控制权转移为核心的非现金激励,从而减少了风险投资家和创业企业家两者之间信息问题和由此产生的委托-代理问题,最终促进创业投资的发展。Venture capital promotes innovation, hign-tech industry and national economic development. Based on the theoretical analyses and model research on the motivation function of the IPO mechanism of the stock market to venture entrepreneurs, the paper shows that the IPO mechanism makes it possible that venture capital can exit through IPO, and which leads to the non-cash motivation mechanism to the venture entrepreneur based on the transfer of corporate control rights, then reduces the informational and principal- agent problems and last benefits the development of venture capital.

关 键 词：创业投资 公司控制权 激励模型 证券市场 IPO机制 

分 类 号：F830.59[经济管理—金融学]