信号传递和信息甄别模型浅析及其应用  

A Brief Discussion on the Model and Application of Signaling and Screening

作　　者：石树琴[1] 

机构地区：[1]复旦大学管理学院,上海200433

出　　处：《复旦学报（自然科学版）》2003年第2期246-252,共7页Journal of Fudan University：Natural Science

摘　　要：尝试将信号传递和信息甄别模型应用于风险投资.提出信号传递和信息甄别的概念,说明风险投资中逆向选择和道德风险的产生及其危害,将信号传递和信息甄别模型应用于风险投资,探索缓解或消除风险投资中逆向选择和道德风险带来的负面影响的途径.The article tries to apply the model of signaling and screening to venture capital (VC) and solve the problems of adverse selection of the investor of VC and moral hazard of ventrue entrepreneur,which are caused by information asymmetry. Part puts forward the concept of signaling and screeing,explains how adverse selection and moral hazard emerge and their harmfulness,pays attention to the application of the model of signaling and screening to VC and makes efforts to eliminate the negative influences of adverse selection and moral hazard.

关 键 词：风险投资家 风险企业家 信息甄别模型 逆向选择 道德风险 信号传递模型 

分 类 号：F830.59[经济管理—金融学] F224.13