国有企业的负债和债转股博弈  

Debt of State-owned Enterprises in State-owned Enterprise and the Game Equilibrium of the Swap of Debt to Equity

作　　者：彭小兵[1] 蒲勇健[1] 

机构地区：[1]重庆大学经济与工商管理学院,重庆400044

出　　处：《重庆大学学报（社会科学版）》2003年第2期61-63,共3页Journal of Chongqing University(Social Science Edition)

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(70171038)

摘　　要：基于国有经济主体产权结构的现状,政府行为的过度介入造成了国有企业债务负担的相当部分,因而债转股博弈必须考虑政府、企业和银行等利益集团在追求自身效用最大化和争夺金融资源支配权中展开的冲突与斗争行为。分析政府在国有企业债务形成中的角色及由此带来的相关问题,认为只要能满足利益主体效用最大化目标,债转股协议就能够在银行、企业和政府之间的相互交易中顺利达成。Based on the actuality of property right mechanism in stateowned economic bodies, the goodsized part of debt burden was brought owing to governments excessive intervention, and the game of swap of debt to equity is played only if interests conflicting and struggling among government, stateowned enterprises, and stateowned commercial banks are taken into account for maximizing their payoffs and seeking of domination for financial resources. The paper conducts an analysis on the role which government acts on during the forming of debts in the stateowned enterprises, and on the relative problems resulting from the conflicting and struggling process. It is concluded that the contracts of debt to equity swap among banks, enterprises and government could be come to during the transactions among them if only the goal of maximizing uses of interest group is attained.

关 键 词：国有企业 金融 债转股 博弈 

分 类 号：F832.0[经济管理—金融学]