论股票期权激励机制异化与舞弊财务报告  

The dissimilation of incentive system of stock option and the embezzlement of financial report

作　　者：王泽霞[1] 张连锋[1] 冯翀[1] 

机构地区：[1]杭州电子工业学院财经学院,浙江杭州310012

出　　处：《华东经济管理》2003年第1期83-85,共3页East China Economic Management

摘　　要：本文探讨和分析了美国股票期权激励机制背离其激励初衷的原因,认识到由于股票期权的滥用、公司治理结构的缺陷、外部监管的不力和法律上的漏洞导致股票期权激励机制的异化及由此产生的舞弊财务报告。针对上述原因,结合我国实施股票期权激励机制的情况,对防范我国股票期权激励机制的异化,提出了几点建议。This paper discusses and analyses the reasons why the incentive system of stock option deviate its initial intention in America.It is realized that abuse of stock option,defect of the corporate governance,ineffective external supervision and leaks in laws lead to the dissimilation of the incentive system of stock option,according to these reasons and considering our countrys implementation of incentive system of stock options,some corresponding advices are pointed in this paper in order to keeping away the dissimilation of incentive system of stock option in China.

关 键 词：美国 股票 期权 激励机制 财务报告 公司治理结构 道德风险 

分 类 号：F837.12[经济管理—金融学]