行政垄断、寻租与腐败——转型经济的腐败机理分析  

Administrative Monopoly,Rent Seeking and Corruption:An Analysis of the Corruption Texture in the Transition Economy

作　　者：过勇[1] 胡鞍钢[1] 

机构地区：[1]中科院-清华大学国情研究中心

出　　处：《经济社会体制比较》2003年第2期61-69,共9页Comparative Economic & Social Systems

摘　　要：本文试图利用寻租经济学的方法 ,对中国渐进转型过程中所产生的特有的腐败形式———行政垄断的本质、成因、形式、特征进行了分析 ;基于现有对转型经济中腐败现象的研究 ,提出了转型经济中腐败现象的新的分类 ;并对行政垄断 ,主要是行业垄断的经济损失规模及租金的耗散等问题进行了初步的研究 ;最后 ,回顾了中国反垄断改革的进展 ,并提出了进一步改革的议程。The coauthors try to use methods of rent-seeking economics to analyze the nature, causes, forms and characteristics of administrative monopoly, a unique form of corruption that has emerged in the process of gradual transition in China. On the basis of the available research in corruption in the transition economy, they propose a further classification of the corruption. In addition, they make preliminary research in the size of economic loss and the loss of rents as a result of administrative monopoly, especially industrial monopoly. At last, the coauthors review the progress in China's anti-monopoly reforms and propose further items for the reform.

关 键 词：寻租经济学 中国 行政垄断 腐败机理 市场经济 经济转型 经济损失规模 租金耗散 法定垄断 

分 类 号：F123.9[经济管理—世界经济] D630.9[政治法律—政治学]