个人所得税偷漏现象的博弈分析  

On the Game of Individual Income Tax Evasion

作　　者：陈平路[1] 王玲玲[1] 

机构地区：[1]华中科技大学管理学院,湖北武汉430074

出　　处：《税务与经济》2003年第3期58-60,共3页Taxation and Economy

摘　　要：政府在对个人所得税制度的设计和实际征管中要考虑政府的政策选择和纳税人对此的反应和行为选择。纳税人在实行偷漏税行为时会权衡自己所能得到的利益和可能受到的惩罚,双方博弈的结果最终会达到一种均衡,使得征纳双方都能接受。The policy choice of the government and the response of the taxpayers should be taken into account when the system of individual income tax is designed by the government. The taxpayers can consider their benefits of punishment when they want to evade taxes, so the result of the game between these two parts will reach an equilibrium which can be recieved by the collection department and taxpayers.

关 键 词：个人所得税 偷税现象 漏税现象 博弈分析 税收制度 税收征管 纳税意识 中国 财政收入 

分 类 号：F812.42[经济管理—财政学]