基于委托—代理理论的政府R&D资源管理对策分析  

Analysis of Management Tactics About R&D Resources from Government Based on Principal-Agent Theory

作　　者：周景泰[1] 

机构地区：[1]同济大学经济与管理学院,上海200092

出　　处：《研究与发展管理》2003年第3期13-16,共4页R&D Management

摘　　要：从博弈论中委托-代理理论出发,分析了政府R&D资源分配和使用中的博弈关系,并以此为基础对政府R&D资源管理的策略进行探讨,提出了完善委托人约束机制、代理人激励机制和研究质量评价机制的若干观点。According to principal-agent theory,it has analyzed the game relations during the course of distribution and usage of government R&D resources. Based on this it has discussed management tactics about R&D resources from government,and put forward some proposals for the improvement of principal-restrained,agent-promoted and research-evaluated mechanisms.

关 键 词：委托一代理理论 政府 R&D资源管理 博弈关系 委托人约束机制 代理人激励机制 

分 类 号：F204[经济管理—国民经济]