我国上市公司控制权私有收益的规模研究  

On the Magnitude of Private Benefits of Control in Chinese Listed Companies

作　　者：刘睿智[1] 王向阳[1] 

机构地区：[1]华中科技大学管理学院,湖北武汉430074

出　　处：《华中科技大学学报（社会科学版）》2003年第3期86-90,共5页Journal of Huazhong University of Science and Technology(Social Science Edition)

摘　　要：控制权私有收益的大小表明大股东对其他股东侵害的程度。文章用ST公告日后1个月到24个月的平均累计超额收益率,测算出我国控制权私下收益的规模高达56.73%,显示我国拥有控制权的大股东对其他股东的侵害非常严重。同时指出降低我国控制权私下受益的措施,除了要进一步建立健全我国的法律制度、完善上市公司信息披露机制之外,还需进一步完善公司治理结构、改革一级市场发行制度。The magnitude of private benefits of control means the extent of appropriation of minority shareholders by controlling shareholders. Using the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) from surrounding ST announcement, we find that the magnitude of private benefits is very large and up to 57.63%, which means the phenomenon—controlling shareholders appropriate minority shareholders—is very severe. And we point out that we can decrease the extent of private benefits of control only by taking such measures as constructing and reinforcing the legal institution, perfecting the information disclosure standard of listed companies, consummating corporate government, and innovating the rules of IPOs.

关 键 词：大股东 控制权的私有收益 公司治理 隧道行为 

分 类 号：F832.5[经济管理—金融学] F276.6