非对称信息条件下成本控制模型研究  

Study on the Cost Control Model Under Asymmetric Information Condition

作　　者：李丽君[1] 黄小原[1] 张晓鸥[1] 

机构地区：[1]东北大学工商管理学院,沈阳110004

出　　处：《中国管理科学》2003年第3期42-45,共4页Chinese Journal of Management Science

基　　金：辽宁省自然科学基金资助项目(9910200208)

摘　　要：运用委托代理理论方法探讨了信息不对称条件下,生产管理者如何激励生产者努力降低成本的问题。信息不对称情况下,管理者不能观测到生产者为降低成本而付出的努力,因此管理者需要对生产者进行激励。管理者根据自己的要求和生产者的自报数确定了一个合约基数,并建立了满足生产者个体理性约束和激励相容约束条件下的管理者期望效用最大化模型,分别以奖励系数和惩罚系数为决策主量。运用进化规划算法作了仿真计算。The problem of incenting producer to reduce product's cost under asymmetric information condition is discussedUnder asymmetric information condition,manager can't observe producer's efforts on reducing cost,so it is necessary to incent producer for managerManager determines a contract base according as his request and producer's self-offered,and the model which maximize manager's expect utility under the condition of individual rationality and incentive compatibility constraint is given,and the decision variable are Encouragement multiple and punishment multipleThe evolutionary programming algorithm is used to do the simulation

关 键 词：非对称信息 道德风险 委托代理理论 成本 

分 类 号：F224.1[经济管理—国民经济]