审计代理问题及其治理  

Agency cost of audit and corresponding countermeasures

作　　者：林钟高[1] 徐正刚[1] 

机构地区：[1]安徽工业大学管理学院会计系

出　　处：《中国注册会计师》2001年第4期18-20,共3页The Chinese Certified Public Accountant

摘　　要：由于信息分布的不对称产生的代理 问题同样存在于审计中。本文运用代理理论简 要分析了审计中存在的代理问题及其形成原因 和危害，提出了明确委托人地位、设计激励相容 的审计合约和将注册会计师聘请与个人财富及 声誉挂钩等三条治理对策。The agency cost induced by the asymmetric information exists in auditing as well. The article applies the agency theory to analyze the agency cost in audit, their origins and harms, Moreover, the article suggests three resolutions to these problems: firstly, to make a clear definition of clients'status; secondly, to include incentive mechanism in audit contracts; thirdly, to link up the work appointment with CPA's personal fortune and reputation.

关 键 词：审计代理 信息不对称 审计合约 注册会计师 委托代理关系 

分 类 号：F239.[经济管理—会计学]