国有企业债转股中的一个委托代理分析框架  

On a Analysis Framework of Principal-agent in the Swap of Debt to Equity of State-owned Enterprises

作　　者：彭小兵[1] 蒲勇健[1] 王惠凌[1] 陈杰 

机构地区：[1]重庆大学经济与工商管理学院,重庆400044 [2]重庆特种设备质量安全检测中心,重庆400020

出　　处：《重庆大学学报（自然科学版）》2003年第8期135-138,共4页Journal of Chongqing University

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(70171038)

摘　　要：在国有企业债转股中,资产管理公司扮演着债转股企业的阶段性持股股东和监督者的双重角色,因而拥有剩余索取权的资产管理公司与债转股企业的关系是可能存在合谋行为的委托代理关系。文章从阐述资产管理公司与债转股企业的博弈关系出发,构造资产管理公司与债转股企业的委托代理分析框架,认为在国家给定对资产管理公司的制度约束和目标考核的激励机制条件下,资产管理公司和债转股企业能够根据其自身的效用最大化原则达成博弈均衡,而国家只需要做的是确定对AMC的制度约束和债转股资产回收的绩效考核机制,或最终承担债转股风险和政策效率的损失。In the swap of debt to equity of state-owned enterprises, Asset Management Corporation (AMC) acts as dual roles of being a staggered stockholder and a supervisor in debt-to-equity swap enterprises, so the relationship between AMC in possession of residual claim and debt-to-equity swap enterprise is principal-agent relationship including collusive action. Begin with analysis on the game relationships between AMC and leaders of debt-to-equity swap enterprises, the article constructs a principal-agent analysis framework between AMC and leaders of debt-to-equity swap enterprises based on information economics. It is concluded that a game equilibrium can come into being between AMC and leaders of debt-to-equity swap enterprises according to the rule of utility maximum when institutional constraints and incentive mechanism of performance examining are certain beforehand, and that state only constitutes institutional constraints mechanism and performance examining mechanism of reclaiming state-owned asset in allusion to AMC, or undertake risk of debt to equity swap and loss of its policy efficiency finally when debt-to-equity swap is lost.

关 键 词：债转股 委托代理 博弈 国有企业 

分 类 号：F224.0[经济管理—国民经济] F276.1