工程质量监控的博弈分析  

Game on the Engineering Quality Supervision

作　　者：王艳[1] 黄学军[1] 王浣尘[1] 

机构地区：[1]上海交通大学管理学院,上海200030

出　　处：《中国软科学》2003年第5期138-141,共4页China Soft Science

摘　　要：采用博弈论的方法对工程质量监控进行了分析。根据模型的不同假设前提,构造了单阶段和多阶段的博弈模型,得出博弈双方的均衡战略,以及某些关键因素(如监理单位对承包商的惩罚系数及监督成本,承包商的骗费额等)对博弈双方的影响,提出了减少工程质量事故发生的建议。Engineering quality supervision is analyzed by using the game theory.Based on different hypothesis models of one-stage game and multistage games are established.And the equilibrium strategy is produced.Some key factors' impacting on the two parties including the mulct coefficient that supervision company punishes contractor,supervision cost and cheat amount are also discussed.Suggestions to reduce engineering quality accidents are made.

关 键 词：工程质量监控 博奕论 博奕模型 工程监理单位 承包商 监督成本 

分 类 号：F284[经济管理—国民经济] TU712[建筑科学—建筑技术科学]