物流管理中的主从对策问题  

Stackelberg Game in Logistics Management

作　　者：管曙荣[1] 常良峰[1] 卢震[1] 黄小原[1] 

机构地区：[1]东北大学工商管理学院,辽宁沈阳110004

出　　处：《东北大学学报（自然科学版）》2003年第9期866-869,共4页Journal of Northeastern University(Natural Science)

基　　金：辽宁省自然科学基金资助项目(9910200208).

摘　　要：研究了一类单卖方、多买方单产品供应链的物流管理,给出了最小补充期协调下的主从对策基本模型,其中卖方为主方,买方为从方·建立了买方成本理性约束下的卖方成本优化模型·并以上海宝钢冷轧板销售系统为对象,应用遗传算法进行了主从对策的仿真实验·实验表明,通过现代物流管理中的最小补充期协调,供应链物流活动的整体利益得以显著改善,双方成本均有不同程度的减少,物流订货补充的主从对策在内部供应链物流管理中的效果尤为明显·The logistics management in a supply chain of single product from a single seller to multibuyer was studied with a basic Stackelberg game model under the coordination of minimum replenishment period presented,where the seller is leader and the buyers are follower. A cost optimization model for seller under the cost rationality of each buyer was established. Applying genetic algorithm, emulation works for Stackelberg game were carried out in terms of the sale system for cold rolling sheets supplied by Shanghai BaoSteel Group. The results show that through the coordination of minimum replenishment period in modern logistics management the integrated interests of enterprises in logistical flow of the supply chain is greatly improved with the costs for both parties decreases correspondingly, especially Stackelberg game in logistics replenishment plays an important role in interior supply chain.

关 键 词：物流 供应链 订货 协调 价格折扣 主从对策 仿真 

分 类 号：O22[理学—运筹学与控制论]