真实活动盈余管理影响审计师的风险决策吗?  

Does Real Activitties of Manipulation Affect Auditors' s Risk Treatment Decisions?

作　　者：李留闯[1] 李彬[2] 

机构地区：[1]西北工业大学管理学院,陕西西安710072 [2]西安交通大学经济与金融学院,陕西西安710049

出　　处：《审计与经济研究》2015年第5期44-54,共11页Journal of Audit & Economics

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(71502139;71572144)

摘　　要：以2000—2012年我国上市公司为样本,分析并检验客户公司的真实活动盈余管理对审计师风险决策的影响。研究发现:客户公司的真实活动盈余管理程度越大,审计师出具非标准审计意见的概率越大、审计收费越高,但和审计师变更没有显著关系。进一步研究还发现:在纵向上,随着法律制度不断完善,审计费用、非标准审计意见的概率和真实活动盈余管理程度之间的关系更敏感;在横向上,审计收费策略和非标准审计意见策略之间存在替代效应。Based on a sample of China listed firms over 2000-2012,we test and find that,with exception of RAM,firms' opportunistic operating decisions are positively associated with higher audit fees and the likelihood of modified audit opinions. In the additional tests,we also find that the relationship between RAM and audit fees or the likelihood of modified audit opinions are more sensitive with the promotion of rule of law,and a substitution relation in auditor's choices between charging more audit fees and issuing modified audit opinions. Overall,the evidence suggests that auditors take actions to share risk with clients involving in the aggressive RAM,and regulators should pay more attention to auditors' risk sharing behavior.

关 键 词：真实活动盈余管理 应计项目盈余管理 审计风险 审计费用 审计意见 风险决策 诉讼风险 法律环境 

分 类 号：F237.2[经济管理—会计学]