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作 者:曹越[1] 姜丽平[1] 张肖飞[2] 伍中信[1]
机构地区:[1]湖南大学工商管理学院,湖南长沙410082 [2]河南财经政法大学会计学院,河南郑州450002
出 处:《审计与经济研究》2015年第5期103-112,共10页Journal of Audit & Economics
基 金:国家社会科学基金项目(11CJY013);中国博士后特别资助项目(2012T50684);湖南省高校创新平台基金项目(11K012);湖南大学青年人才成长计划项目;财政部全国会计领军(后备)人才资助项目
摘 要:以我国2004—2012年A股非金融类地方国有上市公司为研究样本,在区分了省级政府与市级政府控制的基础上,实证检验了各级地方政府不同的政绩诉求对国有企业控制程度是否存在差异及该控制程度对国有企业税负的影响。研究发现:地方政府的政绩诉求(包括财政盈余、相对经济增长率、失业率等)显著影响地方政府对国有企业的控制程度,且省级政府更注重相对经济增长率及失业率,市级政府更关注财政盈余水平;三个政绩诉求中相对经济增长率对政府控制的影响最为显著;地方政府对国有企业的控制程度与企业税负显著正相关;与省级政府相比,市级政府控制的国有企业税负更重。这表明,增加地方国有企业税负是市级地方政府实现其政绩诉求的重要途径。We take our country A shares local state-owned listed companies from 2004 to 2012 as study samples, and divide them into state-owned enterprises controlled by provincial and municipal governments, testing different political achievement demands of local government at all levels in state-owned enterprises' control and tax burden. This study finds that: political achievement demands of local government, such as fiscal surplus, the relative economic growth rates, unemployment rate and so on, significantly affect the degree of local control of the state-owned enterprises, and different administrative levels of gov-ernment have different political achievement. The degree of control of local government has a significantly positive correlation with corporate tax burden. Compared with the provincial government, the tax burden in the corporate controlled by municipal government is heavier. This fully demonstrates that increasing the enterprises' tax burden controlled by the local government is a significant approach to achieve political achievement demands for the municipal government.
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