工业水环境监管的激励-约束-监督机制构建——基于监管主体的委托-代理关系  

Establishment of incentive-constrained-supervised mechanism for industrial water environment regulation based on principal-agent relationship of regulatory subjects

作　　者：赵爽[1] 仇蕾[2] 李昌彦[3] 黄滨[4] 

机构地区：[1]浙江广播电视大学经济管理学院,浙江杭州310030 [2]河海大学管理科学研究所,江苏南京211100 [3]南昌工程学院工商管理学院,江西南昌330099 [4]华东勘测设计研究院有限公司环境与生态工程院,浙江杭州310030

出　　处：《水利经济》2015年第6期45-49,81,共6页Journal of Economics of Water Resources

基　　金：国家社会科学基金(15CGL040);浙江省自然科学基金(LQ14G030020);浙江省教育厅科研项目(Y201328633);浙江广播电视大学科研启动基金(GRJ-13)

摘　　要：分析工业水环境监管利益相关者的委托-代理结构,得出委托-代理风险及其产生原因。进而提出工业水环境监管环境行政合同,建立以环境补贴为方式的激励机制、以环境监察执法和环境行政处罚为方式的约束机制、以中央监察和公众参与为方式的监督机制。构建工业水环境监管模型,得出激励-约束-监督机制的运行机理。最后设计监管合同的实施流程,促进工业水环境监管高效运行。The principal-agent relationship in stakeholders of industrial water environment in China is analyzed, and some principal-agent risks and the relevant reasons are gained. Then,the environmental administrative contract of industrial water environment regulation is proposed. Moreover,three mechanisms are established: the incentive mechanism by environmental subsidies,the constraint mechanism by supervision and law enforcement and administrative penalty,and the supervision mechanism by the central supervision and public participation. Furthermore,a model for the industrial water environment regulation is proposed to get the operating mechanism of the incentive-constrained-supervised mechanism. Finally,a regulatory contract implementation process is designed for promoting the efficient operation of industrial water environment regulation.

关 键 词：工业水环境监管 委托-代理 环境行政合同 激励-约束-监督机制 实施流程 

分 类 号：X322[环境科学与工程—环境工程]