银行监管的微观基础和战略监管体系选择  

The Microfoundation for Banking Regulation and the Optimal Regulatory Framework

作　　者：韩志萍[1] 

机构地区：[1]中央财经大学,北京100081

出　　处：《中央财经大学学报》2003年第10期41-45,共5页Journal of Central University of Finance & Economics

摘　　要：本文探讨了银行监管的微观基础,认为在信息不对称以及银行业不完全竞争的作用下,银行业具有内在的不稳定性,需要外部监管力量的支撑来维护稳健经营,但是政府机构监管作为监管垄断力量会引发一系列新的道德危害从而导致监管失灵。文中详细分析了各种重要的监管措施带来的正负影响,在此基础上提出监管的战略体系至少应当包括监管、激励结构、市场约束和公司治理。This paper discusses the microfoundation for banking regulation, which are information a-symmetry and incomplete competition. Since these factors can lead to bank failures and thus generate great economical distress, there are strong reasons to justify the official intervention. As the factual monopoly regulatory power, official regulation renders new failure. So there need to develop some complementary power to effectively regulate banking. At last an outline of regulatory framework is suggested for further discussion.

关 键 词：银行监管 微观基础 监管失灵 战略监管体系 

分 类 号：F832.1[经济管理—金融学]