新股首次公开发行的抑价现象:一种合作博弈的理论方法(英文)  

Underpricing of Initial Public Offerings: A Cooperative Game Theoretic Approach

作　　者：张处[1] 

机构地区：[1]香港科技大学

出　　处：《复旦学报（自然科学版）》2003年第5期643-654,共12页Journal of Fudan University：Natural Science

基　　金：FinancialsupportfromWeiLungFellowship

摘　　要：新股在首次公开发行(IPO)时具有正的净现值以及承销商在不完全竞争的条件下会存在抑价现象.抑价现象的存在是由于发行企业不能获得所有的净现值收益.在这个博弈当中,收益在发行商和新的投资者之间的分配取决于所有IPO市场的竞争程度.IPO市场可以被细分为具有高净现值的发行企业、高威信的承销商和具有低净现值的发行企业、低威信的承销商两类新股.Underpricing of initial public o erings (IPOs) is implied by the conditions that the IPOs have positive expected netpresentvalue (NPV) and that the underwriters of IPOs are not perfectly competitive. Underpricing results from the inability of issuing firms to reap all the gains of the NPVs. In an assignment game, the gains to the issuing firms and to the new investors are allocated according to their competitive strength in the overall IPO market, and the IPO market is shown to be segmented between large NPV issuing firms with prestigious underwriters and small NPV issuing firms with less prestigious underwriters.

关 键 词：IPO 抑价 博弈 

分 类 号：F830.59[经济管理—金融学]