我国银行授信中委托—代理关系的异化——中山集团呆滞贷款处理案例的博弈分析  

The Dissimilation of the Principle-Agent Relationship in Bank Loans in China

作　　者：黄宪[1] 代军勋[1] 

机构地区：[1]武汉大学商学院,湖北武汉430072

出　　处：《中国软科学》2003年第10期45-48,共4页China Soft Science

基　　金：国家自然科学基金学部主任基金应急研究项目"我国市场主体信用制度建设研究"课题之五"中国市场主体信用行为案例分析及理论研究"(项目编号:70141013)的部分成果。

摘　　要：委托—代理关系的效果主要通过激励约束机制来实现。这种机制对处在银行授信工作前沿的银行基层行长尤为重要。本文通过对一个贷款呆滞案例的研究,分析了基层行长作为代理人在这一呆滞贷款形成中的作用和行为动机,发现在我国基层银行中,尽量掩盖和推迟揭示信用风险是一种普遍的现象,其中隐藏的深层次原因在于对基层行长的激励约束机制不合理:一是激励约束不对称,二是缺乏对风险揭示的激励,三是任期不确定。文章最后针对性地提出了对策建议。The effect of the Principle -Agent relationship is realized mainly through the incentive -restrain mechanism.The incentive-restrain mechanism is particularly important to bank presidents at the local level.This paper analyses the role and motive of local bank president as an agent in the bad loan through a case study.This paper reveals that it is a kind of general phenomenon in the banks at the local level to try their best to conceal and postpone announcing the credit risks.The hidden profound reason lies in the unreasonable incentive-restrain mechanism to them,which expressed as asymmetrical mechanism,the encouragement to the risk announcement is lacking and term of office is uncertain.Last part of the paper has put forward some countermeasures and suggestions.

关 键 词：银行 授信工作 中国 委托-代理关系 信用风险 博弈分析 激励约束 风险揭示 

分 类 号：F832.3[经济管理—金融学]