招投标腐败行为博弈分析  

Analysis of Corrupt Competition in Bids

作　　者：邓培林[1] 张瑞明 

机构地区：[1]西南交通大学经济管理学院,四川成都610031 [2]中铁二局集团有限公司青藏铁路公路指挥部,西藏拉萨850000

出　　处：《西南交通大学学报》2003年第6期691-694,共4页Journal of Southwest Jiaotong University

摘　　要：运用博弈理论为分析工具,建立集体利益同盟博弈模型,对集体成员的行为描述,并针对招投标工程中行为问题,分析了成员间在博弈过程中的相互依赖关系,讨论了"分利集团"的基本特征,认为降低预期收益和提高预期成本,是抑制非法收益的有效对策.Based on the game theory, a game model was proposed to describe the behaviors of a benefitshared alliance. Mutually dependent relationship between members in the competition procedure was analyzed. In addition, the basic features of profitdividing groups was discussed, and a conclusion was drawn that lowering expected profit and increasing initial cost are efficient measures to prevent illegal profits in the competition.

关 键 词：博弈论 均衡策略 忠诚系数 

分 类 号：F830[经济管理—金融学]