不完全信息下电力市场竞价的博弈模型  

Selection of bidding mechanism with incomplete information

作　　者：丁乐群[1] 黎永亮[2] 潘忠志[1] 

机构地区：[1]东北电力学院管理工程系,吉林吉林132012 [2]哈尔滨工业大学管理学院,黑龙江哈尔滨150001

出　　处：《哈尔滨工业大学学报》2003年第11期1366-1368,共3页Journal of Harbin Institute of Technology

摘　　要：针对在单一购买者的电力市场模式下发电商之间的竞争,在研究了不完全信息条件下电力联营体的最优拍卖机制基础上,将发电商的生产成本或生产函数看作是其私人信息,通过应用博弈论中关于机制设计的理论,建立了电力联营体最优拍卖机制的理论模型.用该模型求出的交易机制可为电力监管部门在进行发电市场的信息引导时提供理论依据.Under the market model of one-buyer, the competitions between generators are realized through their biddings to power net buyer. The optimal bidding mechanism in a power pool with incomplete information is studied. A generator's production cost or production function is considered to be its private information. Through applying the revelation principle of Bayesian game, the theoretical model of optimal mechanism for a power pool is deduced and set up. The result of this model can be used as a rule in steering the power generation market with information.

关 键 词：电力市场 市场竞争 交易机制 博弈论 逆向选择 道德风险 

分 类 号：F416.61[经济管理—产业经济] F224.7