杭州市土地招标出让博弈实证分析  

Positive Game Analysis on Land Bidding Sale in Hangzhou

作　　者：沈兵明[1] 罗罡辉[1] 

机构地区：[1]浙江大学东南土地管理学院,浙江杭州310029

出　　处：《中国土地科学》2003年第5期30-34,共5页China Land Science

摘　　要：在土地使用权出让三种方式中,招标是富有良性竞争的一种方式。以杭州市为实例结合博奕论建立的土地使用权招标出让不完全信息静态博奕模型,通过对博奕均衡的分析指出土地招标出让时投标人越多,越有利于充分实现土地价值;同时城市与城市之间以及大城市内部不同片区之间竞相出让土地的博奕结果,导致土地供给总量过大、土地价格下跌、土地资源浪费、土地效益降低,故土地出让宜采用束放策略。Bidding sale is the most rational method among three ways of land property rights selling. The paper took Hangzhou City as an example and set up an incomplete information static game model for land use rights selling. The result of game equilibrium showed that the more bidding participants ,the more nearing land value. At the same time, too competitively land offering between cities or city's interior resulted in a lot of problems: the total land supply quantity was oversize, land price was declined, land resource was wasted and the benefits from land was reduced, so it's time to take compact policy for land selling.

关 键 词：杭州市 土地使用权出让 招标出让 博弈 土地价格 土地效益 

分 类 号：F299.232[经济管理—国民经济] F299.275.5