非对称信息下建设市场主体利益冲突的分析解决  

Analysis and Settlement for Conflict of Interests by Main Parts of Construction Market with Asymmetric Information

作　　者：韩英[1] 刘长滨[2] 赵振宇[1] 

机构地区：[1]北方交通大学经管学院,北京100044 [2]北京建工学院管理工程系,北京100044

出　　处：《基建优化》2003年第6期28-29,共2页Optimization of Capital Construction

摘　　要：从委托—代理关系的角度考察建设市场中业主与承包商之间的利益关系,指出二者发生利益冲突的根本原因在于利益主体追求的最大目标存在差异性,以及二者之间交易的发生具有信息非对称性。解决利益冲突的有效途径是激励—约束机制的设计。This paper discusses the interest relationships between proprietors and contractors in the construction market based on representations.It points out that the basic source of conflict of interest lies between the different maximum goals pursued by the interest parties and asymmetric information involved in the transactions.The efficient solution is the use of mechanism of stimulus-control.

关 键 词：建设市场 工程承包商 工程质量 施工组织设计 

分 类 号：F284[经济管理—国民经济] TU721[建筑科学—建筑技术科学]