普遍服务与电力零售竞争  

Universal Service and Electricity Retail Competition Reform

作　　者：齐新宇[1] 

机构地区：[1]上海财经大学经济学院,上海200433

出　　处：《财经研究》2004年第1期96-103,共8页Journal of Finance and Economics

摘　　要：传统电力事业由于自然垄断特性而受到政府管制,以垄断者身份经营的电力企业必须同时承担普遍服务义务。放松管制后,电力零售竞争一方面打破垄断、提高效率;但另一方面却对电力普遍服务义务的实现产生了不利影响,并可能导致管制成本的增加。文章对上述问题进行了理论分析,并在此基础上结合我国的实际情况提出政策建议,以期为正在酝酿中的中国电力零售改革提供参考。Owing to its natural monopoly feature, traditional electricity industry has been controlled by the government, while the electricity utility serving as a monopolist, must shoulder certain universal service obligation. With the advent of deregulation, the competition in electricity retailing has broken monopoly and achieved efficiency, but at the same time it has had unfavourable effects on the realization of universal service obligation of electricity and it may lead to the rise of control cost. After making theoretical proof on the above issues, the paper offers policy suggestions according to the real situation in China so as to provide some reference to the current electricity retailing reform in China.

关 键 词：电力事业 普遍服务 零售竞争 

分 类 号：F062.9[经济管理—政治经济学]