上市公司歧视性类股利行为:成因及治理  

Discriminatory Class Dividend Behavior in China's Listed Company:Motivation and Governance

作　　者：胡明霞[1] 

机构地区：[1]西南政法大学管理学院,重庆401120

出　　处：《西南政法大学学报》2015年第6期13-20,共8页Journal of Southwest University of Political Science and Law

基　　金：重庆市教委科学技术研究项目(KJ120107);西南政法大学校级科研项目(2012-XZQN28)

摘　　要：分红权是股东最基本的权利,理应受到平等对待。大股东拥有超控制权,利用掠夺性的歧视性股利政策攫取控制权私利,侵害小股东基本权利,违背了《公司法》倡导的股东平等原则。本文从股东权配置、资本多数决原则、控制权配置角度剖析了上市公司歧视性类股利行为产生的根源,并提出了治理对策:一方面应从市场层面加强投资者保护提高公司治理有效性;另一方面从法律层面加强立法保护,赋予中小股东抗衡大股东权利、提供便利的救济渠道和严格的责任追究机制提出治理对策,从而有效保护小股东基本权利。Dividend rights are shareholders' fundamental rights,which should be treated equally. Large shareholders have control power over the company and use the predatory discriminatory dividend policy to grab the private gain of control power,which violates the fundamental rights enjoyed by minority shareholders. It is against the shareholder's equality principle in company law. This paper analyzes the behavior's causes from the angle of the shareholders' right configuration,the capital majority rule and the control power configuration.We suggest that the investor protection levels should be strengthened to improve the corporate governance effectiveness on one hand. On the other hand,the government should strengthen the legislation protection to guarantee the fundamental rights of minority shareholders,such as giving the minority shareholders' rights to restrain the major shareholders ' control rights, providing convenient relief channels and strict relief mechanisms.

关 键 词：股东权 资本多数决 控制权 股利稀释债权 

分 类 号：D922.291.91[政治法律—经济法学]