证券市场虚假信号传递博弈  

False-Signaling Game in Security Market

作　　者：幸昆仑[1] 杨剑侠[1] 

机构地区：[1]重庆大学工商管理学院,重庆400030

出　　处：《重庆大学学报（自然科学版）》2004年第1期156-160,共5页Journal of Chongqing University

基　　金：国家自然科学基金重点资助项目(50122151);重庆市应用基础研究资助项目(7953)

摘　　要：基于信息不对称,建立了一个证券市场虚假信号传递博弈模型,从以衍生金融市场为"误导"工具的角度对股市羊群行为的产生机理进行了阐释,得出了普通投资者证券市场的分离均衡结论。进而,对中国证券市场发展及我国衍生金融市场的开放与发展提供了政策参考。Based on informational asymmetry,this article builds up a false-signaling game model in security market.The game model illuminates the mechanism of Herd Behavior in the stock market by a way in which the more-informed investor cheats the less-informed investor through the derivative financial market .Meanwhile,it makes a conclusion of separating equilibrium for common investors'security investment.Finally,the article gives some policies for reference for both the development of Chinese security market and the opening as well as development of Chinese derivative financial market.

关 键 词：羊群行为 信息不对称 虚假信号传递博弈 证券市场有效性 

分 类 号：F830[经济管理—金融学]