相互依赖研究评述  

A Study of Interdependence

作　　者：余万里[1] 

机构地区：[1]中国社会科学院美国研究所

出　　处：《欧洲研究》2003年第4期51-61,共11页Chinese Journal of European Studies

摘　　要：本文旨在评述国际政治经济学关于相互依赖的理论和研究方法。文章指出 ,相互依赖的敏感性和脆弱性导致了现实主义和自由主义在基本概念、相互依赖与权力的关系、相互依赖与和平的关系等问题上的分歧。文章概述了相互依赖研究的三种方法 ,预期收益模型、博弈论和实证主义 ,指出了现有的相互依赖理论在方法上存在的缺陷和空白 ,并且提出了今后理论发展的方向。By examining the theoretic approaches to interdependence in international political economics and its methodology,this paper points out that,the debates between realist and liberalist on basic concepts,the relationship between interdependence and power,interdependence and peace and etc.,are stemmed from the sensitiveness and fragility of interdependence.By working over the three methods of interdependence studies (“expected utility model”,“strategic game forms”and “empirical studies”),it reveals the weakness and shortcomings in the theory of interdependence and its methodology. In the meantime it suggests that future study should break the present paradigm and examine the impact of interdependence from the prospect of domestic politics.

关 键 词：相互依赖理论 国际关系 国际政治经济学 研究方法 现实主义 自由主义 和平 预期收益模型 博弈论 实证主义 

分 类 号：D81[政治法律—国际关系]