振荡型群体性突发事件中信息特征的演化博弈分析  

Evolutionary Game Analysis of Information Characteristics in Oscillating Mass Emergency

作　　者：刘德海[1,2] 苏烨[1,2] 王维国[1,2] 

机构地区：[1]东北财经大学经济计量分析与预测研究中心,辽宁大连116025 [2]东北财经大学数学与数量经济学院,辽宁大连116025

出　　处：《中国管理科学》2012年第S1期172-178,共7页Chinese Journal of Management Science

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(70901016;71171035;71271045);辽宁省社会科学规划基金项目(L11BGL007);2012年辽宁省高等学校优秀人才支持计划(CLJQ2012099)

摘　　要：信息的及时获取分析和舆情的有效引导是突发事件应急管理的核心科学问题之一。沿着建立信息传播演化规律的数理模型研究思路,综合考虑群体性突发事件中不同利益方同时存在着信息过剩、信息匮乏和虚假信息等信息特征,建立信息传播的演化博弈模型。其中,过剩信息是政府舆论引导措施的减函数,匮乏信息是政府信息搜集措施的增函数,虚假信息体现在误估模型的收益参数。结合凤翔"血铅事件"案例,分析了各种信息特征对振荡型群体性突发事件的演化影响。研究表明:过剩信息加大了事态的振荡频率;地方政府信息匮乏时事件发生概率的周期增大;降低地方政府的问责成本,提高弱势群体的收益份额,减少上访成本,将增大事件发生概率。It is one of key scientific problems in emergency management that information rapidly obtaining and analyzing,and public opinion effectively channeling.Along with the research idea of building mathematical model to analyze the information dissemination,the evolutionary game model is built in this paper,considering the multiple information characteristics among the stockholders of mass emergency,which include surplus information,information shortage and false information.Surplus information is the decreasing function of measurements channeled public opinion,information shortage is the increasing function of measurements collected information,and false information is shown as misestimating parameter.According to lead poisoning cases in Fengxiang town,the effect of information characteristics on oscillating mass emergency is analyzed.The result shows that surplus information increases the oscillation frequency of event,information shortage increases the cycle of event.If decreasing the punishing cost of local government and the petitioning cost of vulnerable group,and improving the sharing proportion of vulnerable group,the happening probability of mass emergency will increase.

关 键 词：振荡型群体性突发事件 演化博弈 信息过剩 信息匮乏 虚假信息 

分 类 号：C931[经济管理—管理学] F224.32