网络平台销售模式中的需求信息分享策略研究  

Demand Information Sharing Strategies in Online Platform Selling Mode

作　　者：罗春林 毛小兵[2] 田歆[1,3] 

机构地区：[1]中国科学院大学经济与管理学院,北京100190 [2]江西财经大学信息管理学院,江西南昌330013 [3]中国科学院虚拟经济与数据科学研究中心,北京100190

出　　处：《中国管理科学》2017年第8期149-157,共9页Chinese Journal of Management Science

基　　金：国家自然科学基金重大项目资助(71390330);国家自然科学基金资助项目(71461009;71202114;71261006);山东省自主创新及成果转化专项项目(2014ZZCX03302);江西省自然科学基金项目(20151BAB207061)

摘　　要：研究了两竞争制造商通过同一网络平台销售产品的需求信息分享问题。已往研究表明,信息分享一定会为参与企业带来更多的利润,然而研究发现,在网络平台销售模式下,当平台提成比例过高而产品生产的规模经济比较明显时,分享需求信息却不一定会为平台带来更多的期望利润。在规模经济的时候,不获取信息的制造商可以从竞争制造商获取信息行为中收获搭便车效应,而在规模不经济的时候,不获取信息的制造商却须为此付出代价。当平台的需求信息越准确时,获取信息带来的利润就越多。Recent years have witnessed the development of electronic commerce.A large number of manufacturers have transferred the selling mode from the traditional wholesale mode to the online platform selling mode through a platform such as tmall.com.Under the traditional wholesale mode,the retailer buys the products from the manufacturer and then sells them to the consumers.However,under the online platform selling mode,the platform just provides the service for the manufacturers' selling products and keeps apercentage of the sales revenue.The platform acquires rich market data about sales and consumers,and thus has more accurate demand information than the manufacturers.How to share the demand information strategically in online selling mode is an interesting research question.On the other hand,there often are several competing manufacturers(e.g.,different brand manufacturers)that produce the similar products and sell them through a common online platform.In the paper,the information sharing problem is studied based on the approach of game theory with incomplete information,in which the platform firstly offers the information contracting and then the manufacturers determine to accept the offer or not.Our research contributes to the literature in considering the information sharing strategies in online selling mode.The extant researches revealed that sharing information will benefit the firms by earning more profit.However,our analytical results show that when the percentage of commission is large and the economy of scale is high,sharing information may not bring more profits for the platform.When the production is economy of scale,the manufacturer who is uninformed of the demand information,acting as a free rider,may benefit from the behavior that the competing manufacturer acquires the demand information;whereas the production is diseconomy of scale,the uninformed manufacturer will be hurt by such behavior.And the more accurate the information is,the more profit acquiring information will bring.Moreover,our numerical a

关 键 词：信息分享 网络平台 竞争 贝叶斯均衡 

分 类 号：F224[经济管理—国民经济] F274