碳减排奖惩机制下地方政府和企业行为演化博弈分析  

A Study of Local Governments' and Enterprises' Actions in the Carbon Emission Mechanism of Subsidy or Punishment Based on the Evolutionary Game

作　　者：焦建玲[1] 陈洁 李兰兰[1] 李方一[1] 

机构地区：[1]合肥工业大学管理学院,安徽合肥230009

出　　处：《中国管理科学》2017年第10期140-150,共11页Chinese Journal of Management Science

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目资助(71573069;71271074;71503065);教育部人文社会科学青年基金项目(14YJC630061)

摘　　要：在静态和动态碳减排奖励与惩罚机制下,考虑碳排放约束的地方政府和企业群体行为的演化博弈,重点分析了碳配额、碳交易价格、政府监督成本和企业减排投资(减排效果参数)对演化稳定策略(ESS)的影响,最后进行了算例分析。研究结果表明:在动态奖励与惩罚机制下,地方政府和企业的演化轨迹围绕着唯一的演化稳定策略螺旋趋近。碳配额对地方政府监督策略的作用与企业单位减排量市场收益的大小有关,政府监督成本和减排效果参数对地方政府监督策略起负向作用;政府监督成本对企业诚实减排策略起负向作用。随着碳交易价格的不断上升,地方政府监督的积极性先增加后降低,企业碳交易行为由购入碳排放权转为出售碳排放权,但是地方政府监督行为的转变滞后于企业减排行为的转变。研究结果对碳交易体系下政府减排策略制定和企业减排投资具有较强启示。In the process of carbon emission mitigation,as two major participants of emission mitigation,government and enterprise play crucial roles,and subsidy and punishment are two key methods of government.However,the objectives of government and enterprise are not consistent and there exists a game between these two participants in the implementation of carbon emission mitigation.It is critical to handle correctly the contradiction between the government and enterprises.Considering that evolutionary game theory is an effective method in the research of this contradiction,an evolutionary game model is constructed in this paper under the mechanism of static and dynamic subsidy or punishment by local government.Four Influencing paramenters,including carbon allowance,carbon trading price,goveornmental supervision fee and enterprice abatement invest(emission reduction effect paramenter),are compared for their contributions to the evolutionarily stable strategy.The results show that:(1)under the mechanism of dynmaic subsidy or punishment,the trajectory of evolutionary game,cycles around and approach spirally the only evolutionarily stable strategy,is less influenced by the original states of local governments and enterprises.(2)Both the governmental supervision fee and enterprice abatement investment have a negative effect on the action tactics of government supervision.(3)The the impact of carbon allowance on government is relate to the per unit of emission redcution market returns.(4)With the increase of governmental supervision fee,the level of honestly reducing emission will reduce.(5)As carbon trading prices rising,the positivity of government supervision increases initially and then decreases,the actions of enterprise carbon trading vary from buying to selling carbon emission rights,but the transition of the governmental supervision actions lag behind the change of enterprise carbon trading behavior.Furthermore,according to the request of model and the actual environment of carbon market in China,an analysis about all

关 键 词：奖励与惩罚机制 碳排放约束 演化博弈 演化稳定策略 

分 类 号：F224.32[经济管理—国民经济] F270[环境科学与工程—环境工程] F279.2X321