零售商主导型供应链中的知情委托方赊销契约机制设计  

Trade Credit Contracts Design by an Informed Principal in Retailer-dominant Supply Chain

作　　者：鄢仁秀[1,2] 汪贤裕 

机构地区：[1]成都理工大学核技术与自动化工程学院,四川成都610059 [2]四川大学商学院,四川成都610064

出　　处：《中国管理科学》2017年第11期85-93,共9页Chinese Journal of Management Science

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71502037,71501019);教育部人文社科青年基金项目(15YJC630149,14YJC630020,14YJC630187);四川省教育厅人文社科一般项目(16SB0075);成都理工大学机械工程专业教学创新团队项目(10912-JXTD201501)

摘　　要：为了研究供应链赊销交易中知情委托方向代理方进行信号显示的问题,考虑由一个供应商和一个零售商组成的二级供应链,双方进行赊销交易。零售商作为核心企业,拥有销售能力的私人信息。基于显示原理,首先设计了具有激励性质且保证供应商单独可获利的低信息密度最优配置,并分析了博弈的完美贝叶斯均衡。结果表明,知情零售商通过提供低信息密度最优配置向供应商传递信号,但存在信号成本,具体表现为:契约呈现"低端不扭曲,高端向上扭曲"特性;且对高能力零售商的初始资金有门槛要求。其次,通过分析知情零售商提供的事中有效配置发现,当供应商对零售商所属类型的信念满足一定条件时,低信息密度最优是事中有效的,此时博弈存在唯一的完美贝叶斯均衡。否则,由事中有效确定的均衡配置集弱帕累托占优于低信息密度最优;高能力零售商的信号传递成本相对降低,具体表现为:"高端向上扭曲"的程度相对较低,且向供应商提供初始资金的门槛要求也更低。本文的研究对供应链管理中,知情委托方的赊销契约设计问题提供了一定的理论基础和实践指导。Mechanism design by an informed principal needs to take into account the informational leakage taking place when offering a contract to the agent.In this paper,the problem of contract design by an informed principal under trade credit in supply chain is investigated.More specifically,a supply chain consisting of a risk-neural supplier and a risk-neural retailer is considered.As the core enterprise,the retailer finances the inventory using trade credit from the supplier.By the Revelation Principle,we design the lowinformation-intensity optimum allocation(LII)with incentive compatibility is designed,to realize the informational leakage to the supplier,and avoid the imitation between different types of retailers.By means of the mechanism way of deriving the equilibrium applied by Tirole,it is found that under the weak monotonic profit assumption,the separating allocation is the LII.It's also shown that to sign the true type to the supplier,the optimal contracts for the retailer with higher ability entails an upward distortion,which causes signaling cost.And the degree of distortion decreases with the increase of the retailer's initial capital.Meanwhile,the contracts have restrictions of the initial capital.Furthermore,the interim-efficient allocation(IE)is presented to analyze the perfect Bayesian equilibrium(PBE)of the game.It can be shown that the LII is the unique PBE for certain supplier's ax ante belief.Otherwise,the set of equilibrium payoffs for the two types of retailers weakly Pareto-dominate the LII.And the(IE)still present the same distorted characteristic as the LII,but has lower restrictions on the retailer's initial capital.Our research will provide some theoretical basis and practical guidance for the mechanism design by an informed principal under trade credit in supply chain.

关 键 词：赊销 知情委托方 机制设计 低信息密度最优 事中有效 完美贝叶斯均衡 

分 类 号：F2[经济管理—国民经济]