委托代理理论与降低成本策略  

Principal-Agent Theory and Strategy to Decrease Cost

作　　者：李丽君[1] 黄小原[1] 张晓鸥[1] 

机构地区：[1]东北大学工商管理学院,辽宁沈阳110004

出　　处：《东北大学学报（社会科学版）》2003年第5期333-335,共3页Journal of Northeastern University(Social Science)

摘　　要：运用信息经济学中的委托代理理论分析了管理者和生产者之间的委托代理关系,阐释了成本降低过程中作为代理人的生产者存在的"道德风险"问题,探讨了信息对称(无"道德风险")和信息不对称条件(存在"道德风险")下降低成本的策略。研究指出:以成本降低额分享率为决策变量,可以降低产品的生产成本;对称信息条件下,成本降低额分享率的确定只需考虑生产者的参与约束;非对称信息条件下,管理者在确定成本降低额分享率时必须考虑激励相容约束。The principalagent relation between management and workers is analyzed by use of the principal-agent theory in information economics. It is indicated that the workers as agent is subject to 'moral hazard'. The strategies to decrease cost under symmetric and asymmetric information conditions, i.e., with and without 'moral hazard', respectively, are discussed. The results show that the cost of production can be decreased by choosing appropriate sharing rate of cost; only the performance of and restraint on workers are taken into account to determine the sharing rate of cost under symmetric information condition; the management should consider the incentive policy compatible to the restraint when determining the sharing rate of cost under asymmetric information condition.

关 键 词：委托代理理论 非对称信息 道德风险 成本 

分 类 号：C935[经济管理—管理学]