“拉关系”与纳税人逃税行为  

Establishing Relations" and Taxpayers' Evasion Behavior

作　　者：李文宏[1] 

机构地区：[1]厦门大学财政系,福建厦门361005

出　　处：《天津商学院学报》2004年第1期29-33,共5页Journal of Tianjin University of Commerce

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(70173010);教育部"十五"规划项目(01JB790040)

摘　　要：纳税人通过与税务部门"拉关系"来达到逃税的目的,在中国这是一个普遍的现象。本文将纳税人通过"拉关系"来逃避惩罚这一因素纳入模型之中,考察提高税率对纳税人逃税行为的影响。分析表明,纳税人的逃税方式取决于"关系努力"的边际生产率。在"关系努力"的边际生产率足够大时,提高税率会导致纳税人更加努力地与税务部门拉关系,以达到逃税的目的。It is a common phenomenon in China for taxpayers to evade tax liabilities through 'establishing relations' with tax authorities. This paper examines the effect of an increase in the tax rates on tax evasion in a model where taxpayers make efforts to avoid possible penalties by establishing relations with tax authorities. The analysis shows that the effect depends on the marginal productivity of 'relationship efforts'. If the marginal productivity is not too small, an increase in the tax rates leads to greater tax evasion.

关 键 词：纳税人 逃税 税务部门 中国 税收征管 

分 类 号：F812.42[经济管理—财政学]