董事的持股权、公司治理与绩效:理论与经验  

Ownership of Directors, Corporate Governance and Performance: Theory and Experience

作　　者：于东辉[1] 于东智[2] 

机构地区：[1]山东工商学院,山东烟台264005 [2]中国人民大学商学院博士后工作站,北京100872

出　　处：《烟台大学学报（哲学社会科学版）》2003年第4期425-431,共7页Journal of Yantai University(Philosophy and Social Science Edition)

摘　　要：董事制度为公司的权益资本和管理雇佣契约提供了治理上的安全措施。负有受托责任义务的董事同样需要激励机制的作用以使他们更好地为股东服务。在目前的制度环境下,让董事持有本公司一定数量的股份并在任期内锁定,会有助于增进股东价值。这个理论假说得到了上市公司的经验数据的支持。在上市公司内推行董事持股制度,并完善配套法规是目前提升公司治理效率的一项有力措施。Board of directors provides the safe governance measures for ownership and contract of employment. Directors taking on steward obligation need mechanism of stimulation so that they serve better for shareholder. Making directors hold stock of own corporate locked in tenure help to add value of shareholder. This theory is held out by empirical data of China PLC. Now, There are powerful measures to upgrade efficiency of corporate governance, which are pushing the move that make directors hold stock of own corporate, and consummate correlative measures.

关 键 词：董事 持股权 公司治理 

分 类 号：F290[经济管理—国民经济]