激励规制理论与商业银行监管  

A Discussion about the Incentive & Regulation Theory and the Supervision of Commercial Banks

作　　者：冉勇[1] 蒲勇健[1] 

机构地区：[1]重庆大学经济与工商管理学院,重庆400044

出　　处：《金融理论与实践》2004年第2期12-14,共3页Financial Theory and Practice

摘　　要：激励规制理论认为,消除规制与被规制机构之间的信息不对称问题,关键是激励规制制度的建立要使两者的目标尽可能保持一致。激励规制理论中的事先承诺制在我国银行监管中的引入就较好地符合了这一要求,从而有助于提高监管效率,防范金融风险,促进社会福利最大化。The Incentive & Regulation Theory holds that the key to the elimination of the information asymmetry between the regulator and the regulated institution is to bring about the tacit agreement of their targets through the operation of the incentive & regulation mechanism. The Pre-commitment Approach in the Incentive & Regulation Theory, which is being put into practice in our banking regulation, just satisfies this requirement. It has been proved that this approach is of a great help to the increase of the efficiency of regulation, the prevention and elimination of financial risks, and the maximization of social welfare.

关 键 词：激励规制理论 商业银行 银行监管 事先承诺制 金融机构 风险管理 监管成本 处罚标准 信息披露 监管者 

分 类 号：F830.33[经济管理—金融学]