不完全竞争市场下的VER、FDI与福利关系的研究  

Research on the Relationship among VER? FDI and Welfare under the Imperfect Competition Market

作　　者：钱春海[1] 欧阳令南[1] 

机构地区：[1]上海交通大学管理学院,上海200030

出　　处：《管理科学》2003年第5期31-35,36,共6页Journal of Management Science

摘　　要：通过研究不完全竞争市场下的自动出口限制、外商直接投资与福利之间的关系,发现:①一旦出口厂商到进口国从事外商直接投资后,不管外商直接投资与自动出口限制的产品间是否存在品牌内差异,进口国厂商都不会再要求进口国政府设置自动出口限制加以限制;②当出口厂商到进口国从事外商直接投资后,进口国与出口国的最优贸易政策都为自由贸易政策;③在自动出口限制与外商直接投资下出口国所生产的产品差异化程度越高,本国的福利就越有可能增加,而进口国的福利就越有可能下降。This paper aims to analyze the relationship among voluntary export restraints and foreign direct investment and welfare. The result shows: ①After the firms of exporting country undertake foreign direct investment actions, the firms of importing country do not demand their country to set down voluntary export restraints policy irrespective of intra-brand product differentiation. ②Free trade policy has become the most optimum for both export and host country. ③Increasing intra-brand product differentiation will make the export country better off, while the host country is worse off.

关 键 词：自动出口限制 外商直接投资 贸易政策 

分 类 号：F740[经济管理—国际贸易]